Fragmentation of political power is key to institutional autonomy

At some threshold of consolidation of political power and Executive power, institutions are unable to withstand a predatory Executive and start collapsing. This is inevitable

Published in The Hindustan Times

The past few years has seen the wholesale capitulation of our institutions. Democracy requires institutions inter alia to inquire into and produce “truth”, to mediate, to uphold the rule of law, and to protect citizens from the excesses of the State. The falling of our institutions is a diminishment of our democracy and needs to be resisted. However, contrary to popular characterisation, the falling of our institutions must be seen in a political context which goes beyond individual pusillanimity.

Liberal democracies are premised on separation of powers and a system of checks and balances through this separation of institutional power. However this system works well only when political power is also factionalised. In a democracy, political power is derived from organised public opinion and State's executive power is acquired by winning elections (mix of public opinion, leadership, organisation etc). Institutions work when political power and Executive power is distributed among competing factions. However at some threshold of consolidation of political power and Executive power, institutions are unable to withstand a predatory Executive and start collapsing. This is inevitable and it will be wrong to see this primarily as individual failing.

First, a large part of institutional power is essentially delegated power cause the Executive controls most institutional appointments such as those of Election Commission, Governor, CBI Director, RBI etc. Even appointments such as the CVC where the appointment committee includes the Leader of Opposition, the Executive has a majority and appointments need not be made through consensus. For such institutions, institutional capture is a matter of time if Executive power is not transferred between opposing factions periodically. The Executive can also make it so difficult for independent-minded individuals to function that they may be forced to exit on their own.

Second, even where institutional design insulates the appointment process from the Executive to a large degree, such as the Judiciary, the Executive has a large arsenal of official and unofficial coercive power. Dissent can be neutralised through inducement, marginalisation, intimidation, blackmail, harassment, propaganda, transfers, incarceration, even bodily harm through various arms of the State. A purposeful State needs only a pretext. The availability and alacrity of this coercive arsenal is driven by the likelihood of regime change. Consolidation of political power reduces the threat of blowback and increases the likelihood of allied institutional complicity. Large distributed institutions also have internal contradictions which can be exploited.

Third, institutions derive authority from normative legitimacy. Over the years, this normative legitimacy has been undermined due to various factors, including (perception of) corruption. Moreover, most institutions are dependent on the coercive power of the Executive for the implementation of their orders. This requires the Executive to voluntarily accept the authority of other institutions over it and imposes an automatic horizon of acceptable opposition on institutions when facing down the Executive. The calibration of the level of opposition to the Executive is directly related to the balance of power between the Executive and Opposition and the willingness of the Executive to junk norms for power. This underappreciated point underscores how much our democratic systems rely on the willingness of the strongest player in the game to abide by the rules (Nehru did).

It is evident that while democracy needs institutions to function, institutions function within a context. When the UPA 2 Government was thought to be on its last legs, institutions acquired a radical oppositional streak, driven not by any hallowed institutional independence but by political calculation. Similarly Executive overreach and countervailing institutional pusillanimity is greater in BJP’s second term with consolidation of political power and its willingness to bypass normative thresholds to further consolidate power and crush dissent.

This moment is thus an inflexion point. Institutions may always have been corrupt but when political power is distributed, this corruption is ad-hoc to defuse specific issues or capricious in response to competing levers of power. Such institutional corruption does not impede democratic contestation. The institutional capitulation of today is designed to consolidate political power and dismantle the very constraints on State power which make it possible to contest it. Speaking up without organising is thus no longer enough because we are no longer working within the framework and logic of liberal democracy where the State is responsive to principled criticism and institutions act as countervailing power to the State.

But India is still a democracy. Contrary to common rhetoric, democracy is not a binary construct but operates on a continuum. Important checks and balances have been lost but political and electoral contestation remains open. This underscores the importance and urgency of the political process at this point in Indian democracy and the need to go beyond outrage in an echo chamber to organise public opinion and build coalitions