Indian Liberalism’s Locus Must Shift From State To Society

Indian liberalism has so confined itself to the instruments of the State – state policy and state institutions – that it is unable to regroup around an alternate agenda in the social sphere

Published in The Hindustan Times

There is some consternation and confusion on the way forward among Indian liberals. While there are many internal differences among those who self-identify as liberals in the Indian polity, the manner of working over the years came to be defined by two main features: working through the institutions of the State to influence State policy. This modus operandi is no longer workable under this regime and thus the current state of confusion on the way forward.

The aforesaid modus operandi presupposes first and foremost a State which is receptive and responsive to such interventions creating space not just for direct intervention but also fostering a more responsive ecosystem through allied institutions such as the judiciary, media, Parliament etc. The nature of the electoral mandate since the 1990s - fractured at the national level and distributed at the state level - too created favourable conditions for this way of working. Many levers of the State with varying proclivities and at different levels were available for influence and interference. There was thus a range of liberal activity - mediated and amplified through institutions - directed at influencing State policy. The judiciary supported liberal activism through public interest litigations leading to important advances such the right to food, redress against sexual harassment etc. The National Advisory Council under UPA 1 and 2 created institutional space for liberal intervention in policy making at the national level leading to pathbreaking legislations like the Right to Information, MGNREGA, Forest Rights Act and so on.

While important advances were made, this method of working has made it difficult for Indian liberals to regroup after 2014. The reliance on institutional intermediaries to influence the State has led to poor organisational strength on the ground. As a result, Indian liberals are entirely dependent on the BJP-led regime for space in decision-making. However, since the regime is itself ideologically ranged against liberalism, there is no question of it being responsive to liberals in decision-making. BJP’s near hegemonic presence at the state and national level has also squeezed out almost all space for direct liberal intervention. At the same time, countervailing institutions have been bypassed, browbeaten, co-opted or have capitulated. Indian liberals have thus been disarmed of their main arsenal in the political arena. However, the biggest blow is self-inflicted: Indian liberalism has so confined itself to the instruments of the State – state policy and state institutions – that it is unable to regroup around an alternate agenda in the social sphere.

In fact, it is because Indian liberalism (here I am including liberal political parties) vacated the social sphere that we are unable to counter the rise of the right. On the two basic social needs – identity and community – which have been mobilised by the right to construct its political majority, Indian liberalism has no mass narrative. At lower levels of politicisation, caste and religion offer the most accessible form of identity and community. The right has been able to construct potent politics by fusing majority religion (consolidating caste) with nationalism to fulfil these basic social needs for the electoral majority. On the other hand, pure liberalism can offer a sense of identity and community only to a rarefied set because it pursues an ever-higher level of actualisation for the individual from the mainstream. However, not only have liberals not attempted to construct an alternative source of identity and community for the masses, liberals have explicitly ranged themselves against the majority. To the extent that liberals have engaged with the question of identity, it has always been with respect to state policy to protect or advance minority interest: minority/weaker groups vis-à-vis majority/dominant groups or individual vis-à-vis group. Culture is one area where Indian liberalism could construct an accessible mass identity and community but instead Indian liberals are often found nit-picking cultural practices. It is true that many cultural practices are flawed in multiple ways but they also provide engagement for the masses. Similarly, nationalism fused with majority community provides a heady mix of power, purpose, and virtue. If Indian liberalism is to be electorally sustainable, it will have to engage with these issues instead of ignoring or dismissing them.

In the run-up to the 2019 election, Indian liberalism attempted to construct a majority by amplifying and aggregating various discontents with the State (as personified by Modi). Majority social mobilisation was acknowledged but not countered. The scale of BJP’s victory showed that social needs trumped economic grievances. Yet there is still one strong section, which believes that an unremitting focus on economic issues – employment, financial distress, is the way forward to oust this regime. This strategy again draws from Indian liberal proclivity to concentrate on the State and is in stark contrast to Gandhi’s liberalism, which played on the dialectic between the social and political spheres. Nor did Gandhi diminish the visceral role of religion in people’s lives constructing instead a more plural national identity. Gandhi’s overt religiosity even if pluralistic, may now seem outmoded; however, with the question of national identity squarely at the centre of our discourse, Indian liberalism must find a response which appeals to the majority.

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